The frontal pole cortex (FPC) expanded markedly during human evolution, but its function remains uncertain in both monkeys and humans. Accordingly, we examined single-cell activity in this area. On every trial, monkeys decided between two response targets on the basis of a 'stay' or 'shift' cue. Feedback followed at a fixed delay. FPC cells did not encode the monkeys' decisions when they were made, but did so later on, as feedback approached. This finding indicates that the FPC is involved in monitoring or evaluating decisions. Using a control task and delayed feedback, we found that decision coding lasted until feedback only when the monkeys combined working memory with sensory cues to 'self-generate' decisions, as opposed to when they simply followed trial-by-trial instructions. A role in monitoring or evaluating self-generated decisions could account for FPC's expansion during human evolution.
a r t I C l e S
The most anterior part of the cerebral cortex, called area 10 of Walker 1 or the FPC 2,3 , is the largest area in the prefrontal cortex of humans 4 , one that expanded disproportionately during human evolution 5 . FPC has reciprocal connections with most prefrontal areas [6] [7] [8] [9] and its cells have an unusually high density and number of dendritic spines 10 . These properties suggest that FPC is important in prefrontal function.
The anterior prefrontal cortex, including FPC, has been implicated in several cognitive functions, such as establishing task sets 11 , prospectively coding and deferring goals [12] [13] [14] , making preconscious and exploratory decisions 15, 16 , detecting both actual and potential outcomes of decisions 17, 18 , coordinating internal and external influences on cognition 19 , combining results from multiple cognitive operations 2 , processing relational complexity 20, 21 , evaluating selfgenerated knowledge 22 , making evaluative judgments 23 , and detecting or employing deception 24, 25 , among others. Some of these functions can be attributed to nearby areas rather than to FPC per se, but a clearcut understanding of FPC function remains elusive.
Single-cell neurophysiology could provide insight into FPC function, but an overlying bony air sinus limits access to this area in macaque monkeys. Recently, we overcame this problem 26 , and here we examined the neuronal activity that occurred as monkeys performed a strategy task [27] [28] [29] . This task incorporated two factors thought to be important in FPC function: coordinating internal and external sources of information 19 and combining cognitive processes to guide behavior 2 . We found that FPC neurons encoded decisions at the time of feedback.
RESULTS

Behavior
We operantly conditioned two rhesus monkeys to perform an instructed strategy task (Fig. 1a) . Each trial required the monkey to decide on one of two targets for a saccade. A trial began when three stimuli appeared on a video screen: a fixation point (white circle) flanked by two saccade targets (white squares). After the monkey fixated the circle for 1.5 s, a cue instructed either a stay or shift decision. Stay cues required a saccade to the same target chosen on the preceding trial, whereas shift cues required a saccade to the alternative target. In the visually cued strategy task, one of four randomly chosen visual stimuli appeared on each trial. A white vertical bar and a yellow square instructed stay, whereas a white horizontal bar and a purple square instructed shift (Fig. 1b) . In the fluid-cued strategy task, presented in a separate block of trials, one drop of fluid instructed stay and two half-drops instructed shift ( Fig. 1b) . Fluid delivery began at the start of the cue period. In both tasks, provided that the monkey maintained central fixation throughout the cue period (0.5 s) and the delay period (1.0, 1.25 or 1.5 s, randomly selected on each trial), the fixation point disappeared as the 'go' signal, triggering a saccade to one (and only one) of the two targets. When the monkey fixated on a target, both squares were filled in. After a prefeedback fixation period (0.5 or 1.0 s, in blocks of trials), feedback arrived in one of two forms: fluid reward for correct decisions or red squares over both targets for errors. After errors, the cue from that trial repeated on correction trials, which continued until the monkey performed correctly.
Both monkeys performed the visually cued strategy task at better than 90% correct ( Supplementary Table 1 ). In the fluid-cued strategy task, the performance of the first monkey nearly matched this level and the second monkey also performed above chance level ( Supplementary Table 1 ). Reaction times were ~310 ms ( Supplementary Table 2 ) and both monkeys maintained fixation within ±1° on more than 90% of the trials. a r t I C l e S Except where noted, our analyses excluded both error and correction trials. Although we did not design this experiment to distinguish decisions from spatial targets, saccade direction, actions or responses, the results on error trials helped us to make this distinction. Accordingly, we describe our results in terms of the monkey's decisions.
FPC activity during the visually cued strategy task
We recorded neuronal activity in three tasks, two delay conditions and two monkeys ( Supplementary Table 3 ). For the visually cued strategy task, this database included 577 FPC cells: 347 from the first monkey and 230 from the second. A comparison of discharge rates during the fixation, cue, delay and feedback periods (Kruskal-Wallis test, α = 0.05) indentified 274 cells (47%) with significant task-related activity.
We tested each task-related cell for decision selectivity (left versus right) and strategy selectivity (shift versus stay) by two-way ANOVA, separately for each task period ( Fig. 2) . A typical cell with decision selectivity showed increased activity just before ( Fig. 2b) and z score normalized averages ( Supplementary Fig. 3 ) indicated that FPC began to discriminate preferred versus antipreferred decisions ~0.5 s before feedback, a difference that persisted until ~0.5 s after the onset of feedback. The difference in activity between the preferred and anti-preferred decisions served as a measure of decision selectivity (Fig. 2c) . Second, we quantified the strength of decision selectivity using receiver operating characteristic (ROC) analysis. ROC values reflect the ability to decode a signal on the basis of activity during a single trial, without being affected by a cell's overall activity level or its dynamic range. Decision coding was robust at the level of single cells ( Fig. 2d ) and the population mean ( Fig. 2c) . The mean ROC value during the feedback period was 0.69 ± 0.10 (s.d.), which significantly exceeded that for the shuffled data (0.55 ± 0.01, Mann-Whitney U test, P < 0.001).
Error trials
Three separate statistical tests indicated that there was less robust decision coding on error trials compared with correctly performed trials ( Fig. 4) . We performed this analysis at the population level because the relatively small number of error trials precluded a cell-by-cell analysis. First, for preferred decisions, the mean firing rate on correct trials significantly exceeded that on error trials ( Fig. 4a-c) for the overall feedback period (t test, t 4,775 = 3.20, P = 0.0014) and for both its pre-feedback (t 4,775 = 3.25, P = 0.0012) and post-feedback (t 4,775 = 2.70, P = 0.007) components. Second, we performed a bootstrap analysis by shuffling the decision designation (left or right) and recalculating decision selectivity 1,000 times. For correct trials, the observed value vastly exceeded all 1,000 sets of shuffled data ( Fig. 4d Pre-Fb (0.5 or 1. and after feedback but only when the monkey had chosen one of the two targets ( Fig. 2a and Supplementary Fig. 1 ). The frequency of cells preferring the left or right targets did not differ significantly (χ 2 test, χ 2 = 2.46, P = 0.12; 62 left, 38 right).
Of the 274 task-related cells, 100 (36%) showed decision selectivity during the feedback period ( Fig. 3 ). In no other task period did the percentage of decision-selective cells exceed chance level ( Fig. 3a) . With few and weak exceptions ( Supplementary Fig. 2) , task-related cells that lacked significant decision selectivity also only showed activity modulation during the feedback period. Decision selectivity occurred in both the 300-ms period before feedback and the 200-ms period after the onset of feedback, with individual neurons showing various combinations (Fig. 3b) . Strategy selectivity did not occur above chance level in any task period ( Fig. 3a) and FPC cells also failed to encode either cue features or the decision made on the previous trial.
Measures of population activity confirmed the single-cell results. First, we computed the mean discharge rate for decision-selective cells. Both standard population averages a r t I C l e S and Supplementary Fig. 4) . In contrast, for error trials, the observed value fell in the range of the shuffled data. Finally, ROC analysis confirmed that there was weaker decision selectivity during error trials ( Fig. 4e) .
Although all three analyses revealed weaker decision coding on error trials, they yielded inconsistent results as to its statistical significance. The mean firing rates ( Fig. 4a-c ) did not significantly differ on error trials for preferred versus anti-preferred decisions for either the entire feedback period (t 911 = 1.78, P = 0.08) or for its pre-feedback (t 911 = 1.69, P = 0.09) and post-feedback (t 911 = 1.51, P = 0.13) components. The bootstrap analysis ( Fig. 4d ) yielded a significant difference on error trials for the whole feedback period (P = 0.027, two-tailed test), but not for either the pre-feedback (P = 0.10) or post-feedback (P = 0.14) periods, separately ( Supplementary Fig. 4 ). ROC analysis indicated that there was substantial decision coding on error trials during the pre-feedback period but not during the postfeedback period ( Fig. 4e) .
Effects of delayed feedback
Using a control condition, we examined whether decision selectivity developed in relation to the time of the saccade or the time of feedback ( Fig. 5 ). In the standard condition, described above, feedback arrived 0.5 s after the saccade. In separate blocks of trials, which we refer to as the delayed-feedback condition, feedback occurred 1.0 s after the saccade. Feedback-period activity was assessed as before, from 300 ms before feedback onset until 200 ms afterward.
Of 65 task-related cells tested in the delayed-feedback condition, 21 cells (32%) had significant decision selectivity during the feedback period. The percentage did not differ significantly from the 36% observed in the standard delay condition (χ 2 test, χ 2 = 0.4, P = 0.53). Thus, delaying feedback did not decrease the proportion of cells encoding the decision and this result was consistent with the population analysis. In both the standard ( Fig. 2b) and delayed-feedback ( Fig. 5a ) conditions, decision selectivity increased near the time of the saccade and persisted until after feedback, declining thereafter with a similar time course ( Fig. 5b) . Note that had the signal followed a post-saccadic time course, the decay rate observed in the standard condition would have led to a loss of decision coding by the time feedback arrived in the delayed-feedback condition (Fig. 5c ). ROC analysis confirmed the results from population activity averages ( Supplementary Fig. 5 ).
Reward as feedback versus reward per se
Because activity modulation in FPC occurred around the time of reward and was greater for rewarded (correct) than for unrewarded (error) trials ( Fig. 4a-c) , we tested whether the activity reflected the reward delivery per se. In the fluid-cued strategy task, fluid was delivered to the monkey both as the cue and, later, as feedback ( Fig. 1b) . When presented as a cue, the fluid also served as a reward for maintaining fixation until cue onset. Thus, if the FPC cells anticipated or responded to reward per se, then they should have shown significant activity modulation both early and late in a trial. They did not.
We tested 302 neurons in the fluid-cued task, 194 and 108 cells from the first and second monkey, respectively. Of this population, 143 cells (47%) showed task-related activity and 47 of these task-related cells (33%) showed decision selectivity ( Fig. 3c and Supplementary Table 3 ). Figure 3 Decision-selective activity by task period. (a) For the visually cued strategy task, FPC neurons with significant main or interaction effects (two-way ANOVA, with strategy and decision as factors), as a percentage of task-related neurons (n = 274). Dashed line indicates percentage expected by chance. A significantly above-chance percentage of decision effects occurred only in the feedback period (χ 2 test, χ 2 = 83.1, P < 0.001). Fix, pre-cue fixation period; ANOVA was based on the strategy and decision factors from the previous trial. (b) Number of neurons that showed decision-selective activity during the 300-ms pre-feedback period (pre) and the 200-ms post-feedback period (post). Some neurons (unclassified) showed significant decision-selectivity for the 500-ms feedback period as a whole, but not for either its pre-or post-feedback components. (c) Data are presented as in a, for the fluid-cued strategy task (n = 143). A significantly above-chance percentage of decision effects occurred only in the feedback period (χ 2 test, χ 2 = 36.3, P < 0.001). Pref, preferred decision. Activity differed on correct versus error trials for preferred decisions (* P < 0.001), but not for anti-preferred decisions (n.s., not significant, t test, t 4,787 = 0.69, P = 0.49). Activity also differed for preferred versus anti-preferred decisions on correct trials (black bars, t test, . 2b) and in the fluid-cued strategy task (green, from b).
During the fluid-cued strategy task (Fig. 6) , the activity of FPC cells (Fig. 6a) was the same as during the visually cued task, and we confirmed this result for both the population averages ( Fig. 6b,d) and ROC values (Fig. 6c) . In contrast with the results expected for cells related to reward per se, FPC cells showed little, if any, activity modulation early in the trial, either before or after the fluid cue. Activity rates did not differ significantly between the visually cued and fluid-cued tasks during the fixation (t test, t 413 = 0.31, P = 0.76), cue (t 413 = 0.35, P = 0.73) or delay (t 413 = 0.50, P = 0.62) periods. As in the decision and combine this information with a visual cue. As a control, the delayed-response task eliminated these requirements. On each trial, a visuospatial cue (inside the left or right target) guided responses without reference to any previous trial (Fig. 7a) . The time course of events matched the visually cued strategy task. One version of the delayed-response task had the standard, 0.5-s delay between the saccade and feedback, whereas another had delayed feedback (1.0 s). Of 83 task-related cells recorded in this task, 22 (27%) showed decision selectivity during the feedback period (Fig. 7b) . Mean task-related activity did not differ significantly between the visually cued strategy task and the delayed-response task (t test, t 353 = −0.67, P = 0.50 for the fixation period; t 353 = −0.86, P = 0.39 for the cue period; t 353 = −0.59, P = 0.55 for the delay period; t 353 = −0.98, P = 0.33 for the feedback period).
We compared decision coding in the delayed-feedback condition with that in the standard-delay condition. The additional delay in feedback had no effect on decision selectivity for the strategy task, but it had a large and significant effect for the delayed-response task (Fig. 7c) ; only 3 of 34 task-related cells (9%) showed decision selectivity with longer delays, which differed significantly from the strategy task (χ 2 test, χ 2 = 6.70, P < 0.01). Of 21 cells with decision selectivity in the delayed-feedback condition of the visually cued strategy task, we tested eight in the delayed-response task. For this population, decision selectivity decreased significantly earlier in the delayed-response task than in the strategy task (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, P < 0.001), falling to the null level by the time of feedback arrived (Fig. 7d) .
Localization
We reconstructed the recording sites by using magnetic resonance imaging in vivo as well as in histological material by reference to a pin inserted at the center of the recording chamber (Fig. 8) . The recordings came mainly from area 10, which we recognized by the close correspondence of its cytoarchitecture with the archetype of homotypical neocortex.
Despite the fact that we placed the recording chamber more laterally in the second monkey, the results from the two monkeys did not differ notably ( Fig. 8) . For example, both monkeys had nearly the same proportion of task-related neurons (Supplementary The results from the visually cued and fluid-cued tasks were also similar in all other respects. The feedback-period decision signal (Fig. 6d) did not differ between the two tasks in either timing (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, P = 0.26) or magnitude (t test, t 145 = 1.48, P = 0.14), and only the feedback period had higher than chance levels of decision selectivity (Fig. 3a,c) . Similar to the visually cued task, the mean ROC value during the feedback period was 0.72 ± 0.12 (s.d.), which significantly exceeded the shuffled value of 0.57 ± 0.01 (Mann-Whitney U test, P < 0.001).
Strategy versus delayed-response task
To make a decision in the strategy task, the monkey had to remember its previous a r t I C l e S Table 3 ) and they did not differ in the proportion of neurons with decision selectivity (χ 2 test, χ 2 = 0.98, P = 0.32).
DISCUSSION
We found that FPC cells had simple properties. They encoded only the monkey's decision and they did so only around the time of feedback. Most of the remaining task-related cells also showed activity modulation only around the time of feedback but lacked decision selectivity. The relative simplicity of FPC's activity contrasts with the complexity of activity patterns in other prefrontal areas, which have activity related to sensory cues, working memory of previous goals, prospective memory for future goals, and problem-solving strategies 27 , among a long list of cognitive functions 30 . FPC cells do not have any of these properties. Among the properties that they do have, three sets inform and constrain our interpretation of FPC activity: timing, relationship with reward and trial outcome, and persistence for self-generated decisions.
Timing FPC cells encoded the monkey's decision from the time of the saccade until ~0.5 s after the onset of feedback, whether feedback arrived at a standard 0.5-s delay or a prolonged 1.0-s delay (Fig. 5) . The decision signal thus had peri-feedback timing, rather than an exclusively postmovement time course. Although the strategy task required that the monkeys remember their previous decision, the fact that FPC's decision signal dissipated ~0.5 s after feedback indicates that other areas must have maintained this information over the intertrial interval, rather than FPC.
A decision signal around the time of feedback suggests that FPC provides other brain areas, particularly other prefrontal ones 6, 8 , with the information needed to monitor the monkey's most recent decision. The FPC projects to orbitofrontal cortex 7 , for example, and might send it decision information for the computation of expected, earned reward 31 and for assigning credit to decisions that produced a good outcome. Other prefrontal areas might use the same information for making the next decision. FPC's signal could also function in spatially selective top-down attention, which probably ramps up around the time of feedback, when monkeys must attend to their decision and its outcome. Along the same lines, the supplementary eye field and the anterior cingulate cortex also have signals that monitor performance 32 and these areas might also influence or be influenced by FPC. Further studies should compare and contrast monitoring signals among these areas.
Reward and trial outcome FPC cells did not encode the anticipation or delivery of fluid reward when it served as a strategy cue ( Fig. 6) , thus ruling out interpretations of FPC activity in terms of reward prediction or responses to rewards. The observation that FPC cells did not anticipate or respond to rewards when they were cues means that the pre-and post-reward activity seen later in the trial reflected the feedback conveyed by the fluid rather than its rewarding or reinforcing properties. (c) Percentage of decision-selective neurons for the visually cued strategy task and the delayed-response (DR) task, for both the standard-and delayed-feedback conditions. In the delayed-response task, the percentage of decision-selective cells was significantly lower (*) in the delayed-feedback condition than in the standard condition (χ 2 test, χ 2 = 4.49, P = 0.034). In the visually cued strategy task, this difference was not statistically significant (n.s., χ 2 = 0.4, P = 0.53). (d) Population averages for decision-selective neurons tested in the delayed-feedback condition. The activity difference between preferred and anti-preferred decisions is shown for the visually cued strategy task (thick curve) and the delayed-response task (thin curve). Taskrelated cells in the fluid-cued strategy task and the delayed-response task were observed in nearly identical recording sites as those illustrated here. a r t I C l e S Although FPC's decision signal had nothing to do with rewards per se, it was much more robust on correct trials than on error trials (Fig. 4) . Perhaps this result indicates that FPC cells encoded both the monkey's decision and a successful trial outcome. This view, along with the observation that the difference between correct and error trials preceded feedback (Fig. 4b) , might suggest that FPC encoded a prospective aspect of monitoring, such as 'confidence' 33, 34 . Taken at face value, such a signal could serve a useful function. Confidence in an upcoming, earned reward could contribute to the computations performed in areas such as orbitofrontal cortex.
Another possibility, which we prefer, is that the stronger decision coding on correct trials indicates that FPC is involved in monitoring decisions rather than actions and that it monitors certain kinds of decisions. The actions taken on error trials, along with its spatial targets, saccade metrics and related motor factors, did not differ from those on correct trials. But FPC activity differed substantially. The monitoring functions of FPC therefore probably relate to decisions and not to spatial or motor factors. Furthermore, these monitoring functions probably involve decisions made in the context of correct task performance rather than decisions made in other contexts. For example, if the monkey had forgotten its previous decision, the random decisions that followed would have been errors half of the time. In such circumstances and whenever there was noise in the decisionmaking mechanism 35 , a weaker decision-monitoring signal would be expected.
Self-generation
One of our findings highlights the importance of self-generational factors in FPC activity. In the delayed-response task, the location of a visual cue, alone, dictated the monkeys' response on each trial (Fig. 7a) . This control task thus lacked two key requirements of the strategy tasks: remembering the previous decision (or response location) and combining that memory with a sensory cue (stay or shift). The combination of memories with sensory cues thus required monkeys to self-generate decisions, as opposed to simply following sensory instructions that dictated each response. In the delayedfeedback condition, the FPC's decision signal lasted until feedback arrived in the strategy task, but it did not do so in the delayed-response task (Fig. 7c,d) . This result suggests that when decisions involve an element of self-generation, FPC's signal lasts until feedback time and otherwise dissipates. Alternative accounts, such as attentional effects reflecting differences in task difficulty, cannot be ruled out entirely. However, no other aspect of activity differed between the strategy and delayed-response tasks, and our behavioral data did not indicate that the monkeys found the delayed-response task to be easier than the strategy tasks (Supplementary Tables 1 and 2) .
Nevertheless, FPC did encode decisions in the delayed-response task (Fig. 7b) . Because both monkeys had more than a year's experience with strategy tasks before we introduced the delayed-response task, this property could reflect the habit of monitoring decisions even when unnecessary. According to this view, the decision signal was generated habitually, but persisted only when necessary (Fig. 7c,d) . Future recordings from monkeys trained only on the delayed-response task can clarify this issue.
Comparison with human FPC
Despite reasonable evidence that the FPC of rhesus monkeys, area 10, is homologous with at least part of the like-named area in humans, more evidence is needed, especially regarding connectivity in humans. In both species, the FPC has a homotypical cytoarchitecture that is generic even by the standards of such areas. In both species, the FPC has a similar location relative to other prefrontal areas, such as the orbitofrontal cortex and the medial agranular cortex. And, of course, both occupy the frontal pole. But the FPC in humans is much larger than in monkeys and it may have additions or subdivisions that monkeys lack 4 . These differences, among others, limit the applicability of our results to the human FPC, but we can note some apparent similarities.
Our results suggest that the monkey FPC is involved in monitoring decisions and some neuroimaging research in humans supports this idea, especially for medial FPC [36] [37] [38] . Selected neuroimaging research is also consistent with the idea that self-reference is important for FPC function. According to one study, the anterior prefrontal cortex is involved in evaluating self-generated decisions 22 , but the area activated lies lateral and posterior to the FPC as construed here. More often, self-referential functions are ascribed to medial frontal areas 3, 19, [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] . For example, these areas are differentially activated when cues instruct a change in task, much like the shift cue in our experiment, rather than when cues instruct a specific task 44 . These findings tie in with the participation of medial FPC in the 'defaultmode network' 45 and in both self-generation and self-reference, more generally. On the basis of its connections, the monkey FPC appears to lie within a "medial network" 7 , which suggests that the monkey FPC could correspond to the medial FPC in humans.
Interpretational limitations and conclusions
We compared a nonspatially instructed strategy task with a spatially cued delayed-response task, using just two pre-reward delay periods. To test our conclusions, future studies should use an instructed-delay task with nonspatial stimuli and more delays.
Although we cited some selected neuroimaging results above, others are more difficult to reconcile with our findings. We might have predicted that self-generated rules would cause more FPC activation than instructed rules, but in a recent experiment, they did not 46 . Similarly, prospective coding is considered to be an important function of FPC 12 , but FPC cells showed no prospective coding of goals or strategies. Perhaps FPC functions only in particular aspects of prospection. One neuroimaging study indicates that medial FPC activity reflects left-right decisions 16 , as we found, but that signal occurs long before the subject's movement, whereas our signal followed movement. Outcome-related signals occur in Pavlovian conditioning 17 , which requires neither decisions nor actions. These signals could reflect a monitoring process that occurs automatically, even in the absence of decisions or actions. Anterior prefrontal cortex shows activity related to task set 11, 47 and rules 48 , a finding that appears at odds with the absence of strategy-related activity in our data. Here the precise location of neuroimaging activations might be a critical factor. The areas activated with new task sets and rules are situated laterally in the anterior cortex and either correspond to lateral parts of FPC (area 10) or anterior parts of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (area 46 or 47). If the monkey FPC corresponds to the medial FPC of humans, then the absence of such set-or rule-related activity in our results should not be surprising. Finally, although we discuss our result in terms of evaluating the affirmative decision to choose one of the two targets, the decision-selective signal could just as well reflect an evaluation of the choice that was not made 18 . Experiments comparing FPC activity during Pavlovian and instrumental tasks, tasks with more than two choices, and tasks with changing outcome probabilities should help resolve these issues.
In conclusion, our findings suggest that FPC is involved in monitoring and evaluating decisions, especially those with a self-generational component. These functions could account for the marked expansion a r t I C l e S of FPC during human evolution 5 . Our results are also compatible with the idea that FPC coordinates external and internal contributions to cognition 19 and combines the products of separate cognitive operations 2 , in this case involving sensory cues and memories. The combination of cognitive operations across different domains of knowledge could provide a key source of human creativity 49 .
METhODS
Methods and any associated references are available in the online version of the paper at http://www.nature.com/natureneuroscience/.
Note: Supplementary information is available on the Nature Neuroscience website.
